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Mental Accounting in the Housing Market
Abstract We identify a consumer bias with regard to di¤erent sources
of debt-nancing. Less salient debt may generate psychological benets.
This should be weighed against the possible economic costs of a sub-optimal
capital structure, but low levels of nancial literacy make it unlikely that all
households perceive the full economic costs. As a result there is a bias in
favour of less salient debt. In a market with limited scope for arbitrage this
consumer bias is likely to generate ine¢ ciencies. We examine such a market
in both theory and practice. The predictions of our model are given strong
support by market data.
2
1 Introduction
Households face many choices that require nancial judgment. This judg-
ment relies on numeracy skills and on previous experience with nancial
products. When nancial judgment falls short of the mark, households may
make sub-optimal decisions. In some cases, failing to optimize entails a neg-
ligible cost; in other cases, this cost is large. Depending on the market in
question, agents that make sub-optimal decisions may or may not a¤ect the
market equilibrium.
This paper examines certain aspects of a decision faced by many house-
holds: making a debt-nanced acquisition of a home. As our point of de-
parture, we use a survey to identify a consumer bias with regard to debt-
nancing, and suggest some plausible causes of the bias. We then proceed to
examine theoretically how biased consumers may a¤ect prices in equilibrium,
using a simple two-type model that captures our survey results. Finally, we
test our hypothesis against eld data, using a natural experiment to show
that market data supports the predictions of our model.
Debt is at the heart of household nance. It allows for Pareto-improving
equalization of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, as households
incur debt during less a­ uent parts of their life-cycle and pay o¤ the debt
3
during more a­ uent times. The core arguments of the associated optimiza-
tion problem are the cost of capital and the individuals expected income
path. For many households, their home represents the bulk of their assets,
and their mortgage contract is the most important nancial contract they
ever enter into (Campbell and Cocco, 2003). Sweden, which is the focus of
our study, is no exception: real estate amounts to over 70% of household
assets (Campbell, 2006) and the total amount of mortgages outstanding is
equivalent to almost 60% of GDP.1 Despite this, there has been little research
focusing on household mortgage choice. Instead, the existing research into
mortgages has largely focused on mortgage-backed securities.
The Swedish market for owner-occupied apartments o¤ers an opportunity
to study how households perceive capital structures. A key feature of this
market is that all apartments are organized as co-operatives (hereafter: co-
ops).2 Condominiums are not permitted.3 The co-ops can, and typically
do, take on debt. The cost of servicing the debt is passed on to the co-op
members as a part of a monthly or quarterly fee that also includes service
1Source: Swedish BankersAssociation.
2Source: Statistics Sweden.
3In a condominium, apartments belong to their respective inhabitants. Co-op apart-
ments, by contrast, are owned by a legal entity   the co-op itself   which in turn is
owned by the co-op members. The resident owns an exclusive right to inhabit their co-
op apartment. Unlike in some other countries, Swedish co-ops have very weak screening
rights.
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and maintenance costs. Since condominiums are prohibited, we avoid the
endogeneity problem that arises when comparing co-ops and condominiums
in cities or countries that allow both.
In this large market, which represents about one fth of Swedish house-
holds, households debt-nance the purchase of a home in two ways. They
can take out a large personal loan and buy a share in a co-op with low lever-
age, or take out a smaller personal loan and buy a share in a co-op with
high leverage. The two sources of debt-nancing are substitutes. In theory,
under the appropriate conditions, it should not be possible to add value to an
apartment by changing its capital structure analogous to a familiar result
in corporate nance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
The presence of two sources of debt-nancing poses a challenge to house-
hold optimization. A consumer who is choosing between di¤erent apartments
now also makes a choice between di¤erent capital structures. Assessing the
value of an apartment conditional on the amount of debt held by the co-op
is demanding in terms of nancial literacy and numeracy, not least since the
relative cost of the two sources of debt has varied over time.
Currently, interest payments on individually held debt are tax deductible,
whereas interest payments through the co-op are not. This discrepancy makes
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debt-nancing through the co-op almost 50% more expensive than individ-
ually held debt. In a frictionless market, debt would immediately be substi-
tuted toward the cheaper source. In practice, many households may be slow
to optimize co-op capital structures. Debt held by the individual household is
arguably more salient harder to ignore than debt held collectively by the
co-op. The co-op fee is typically not itemized, so in order to ascertain what
share of the fee is used to service co-op debt, a co-op member must make his
own calculations based on the co-ops annual report. This is demanding in
terms of nancial literacy.
The e¤ects of cost salience and limited nancial literacy do not play a part
in the standard intertemporal optimization problem. In practice, however,
these factors may have important e¤ects on economic behavior. If households
experience disutility from awareness about their degree of indebtedness, the
less salient source of debt would carry a non-pecuniary advantage. In this case
the value of an apartment may well be a¤ected by its capital structure. In
addition, households that nd it di¢ cult to calculate the relative advantages
of the two sources of debt-nancing may underestimate the costs of a sub-
optimal capital structure.
Our survey data indicate that many consumers do not have a clear under-
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standing of the optimization problem at hand. We nd a pervasive tendency
to compartmentalize the two sources of debt-nancing. Most survey par-
ticipants were well-informed about their individually held debt, but poorly
informed about the debt held by their co-op. Strikingly, the vast majority
have never thought of the two forms of debt as being, to some extent, substi-
tutes. If our sample is reasonably representative, this suggests that a sizable
fraction of the market is at best characterized by a boundedly rational under-
standing of the co-op capital structure. These ndings are highly consistent
with a scenario in which nancial literacy, numeracy, and salience jointly
produce a systematic bias in the market, in favour of co-op debt. In our
view, the di¢ culty many households have in understanding the co-op capital
structure may go a long way in explaining why such debt is still prevalent,
despite being considerably more costly.
We have good reasons to expect the bounded rationality of some frac-
tion of market participants to a¤ect prices in equilibrium. There are certain
conditions under which individual mistakes need not distort prices in the
long run. In nancial markets, for examples, arbitrage o¤ers sophisticated
investors the opportunity to prot from mis-pricing by naive investors. Al-
ternatively, competition may drive rms to reveal competitorsexploitation
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of consumersmistakes, in order to gain market share. Neither of these
factors are likely to apply to the case at hand. The Swedish market for
apartments is characterized by rent control and other restrictions on renting
out apartments. This amounts to a major limitation on arbitrage opportu-
nities. Converting owner-occupied apartments into rental apartments would
typically entail a signicant nancial loss. When each household owns a sin-
gle apartment at a time, transactions costs from moving make it unlikely
that arbitrage will correct prices, or that any household could internalize the
benets from educatingthe market.
We present a simple two-type model of this market. Both types   naive
and sophisticated agents   solve the same optimization problem, but naive
agents systematically underestimate the relative cost of co-op debt. Sophis-
ticated agents, by contrast, correctly perceive this relative cost. As a re-
sult, naive investors have a more favorable attitude toward capital structures
where more of the debt is held by the co-op and less by the individual house-
hold.
The model predicts a muted market response to changes in the relative
price of the two sources of debt. If naive agents constitute a sizeable frac-
tion of the market and our survey suggest this is indeed the case then
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an increase in the relative price of co-op debt will have a smaller e¤ect on
the relative price of high-debt co-ops than if the entire market consisted of
sophisticated agents.
We test this hypothesis against market data by using a natural experi-
ment, in the form of a large sample of apartment sales around the time of
an unexpected reform in October, 2006. The reform removed a tax that
was paid by co-ops with low debt levels, but not by co-ops with high debt
levels. As a consequence, the relative cost of servicing co-op debt increased
dramatically, making co-op debt almost 50% more costly than individually
held debt. In an e¢ cient market, this change should have had a negative
e¤ect on the relative price of apartments in high-debt co-ops compared to
apartments in low-debt co-ops. Our analysis of sales data shows that while
the relative price change for high-debt/low-debt apartments has the right
sign, the e¤ect was small and far from statistically signicant. Given the
large sample size, we conclude that the data provide a strong indication that
the market response to this natural experiment was, at best, muted   in line
with the prediction of our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some
of the related literature. In Section 3, we describe the survey and report its
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results. In Section 4, we present our model of a market where sophisticated
and naive consumers interact in the market for owner-occupied apartments.
In Section 5, we test the prediction from the model, using a large sample of
apartment sales. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper examines how the lower salience of co-op debt, together with
limited nancial literacy, may generate a consumer bias leading to widespread
mispricing in the housing market. This line of reasoning fuses several strands
of research, primarily within public economics, behavioral economics, and
household nance. In this section, we outline some of the most relevant
literature on salience and nancial literacy. We briey discuss under what
general circumstances consumer bias may be expected to a¤ect markets in
equilibrium. We also review some of recent behavioral studies of the housing
market.
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2.1 Salience
In economics, the term salienceis used to emphasize that all costs are not
equally transparent. A cost is salient if it is relatively visible, transparent,
and hard to ignore. In our model, naive agents are biased toward co-op debt,
which is less salient for at least two reasons. First, the responsibility for
dealing with the debt is delegated to the co-op board. Second, the debt pay-
ments are included in a monthly service charge from the co-op, which is not
itemized. Our survey results, presented in section 3, show that individuals
are considerably more aware of their personal debt than of the debt held by
their co-ops, consistent with co-op debt being less salient.
Salience has been addressed extensively in public economics. Buchanan
(1967) conjectures that the government sector may grow in part through nd-
ing new, less salient ways of raising revenue. A prominent example is income
tax withholding, which makes the taxation of labor less visible to employ-
ees, who do not have to make the payments themselves. Another example is
social security taxes, which make taxation less lucid by conating insurance
and redistribution. When taxpayers underestimate the cost of government
services, demand for government services increases: there is scal illusion.4
4Buchanan attributes this term to Puviani (1903).
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Empirical work in public economics has shown that tax salience can have
large e¤ects on individual behavior. Finkelstein (2007) studies the e¤ects of
introducing electronic road toll collection, which is a less salient levy than
cash payment. She nds that toll rates increase by about 20-40%, and the
short-run elasticity of driving (with regard to toll costs) decreases in absolute
value. Chetty et al (2007) nd that demand elasticity for alcohol is greater
with regard to changes in the excise tax, which is included in the displayed
price, than to changes in the sales tax, which is not. In a parallel eld
experiment, a tax-inclusive price was posted below the ordinary price tag for
selected goods in a grocery store. Scanner data revealed an 8% reduction in
sales for products with tax-inclusive prices, relative to control products and
control stores. And yet a survey conducted at the same time shows that the
consumers were well-informed about sales taxes, suggesting that their results
are driven by the salience of the tax, and not by ignorance of the tax.
2.2 The Pain of Payment
While the public economics literature on salience has focused largely on tax-
ation, this concept can be applied to any type of cost, including the pre-tax
price. A parallel literature in consumer nance looks at how the salience of
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the payment itself a¤ects consumption. In a series of eld experiments, So-
man (2006) nds that consumption is increased when payments become less
transparent. His interpretation of this nding is that consumers experience a
pain of payingand that the pain is smaller not just for lesser amounts but
also for less apparent payments.5 Soman uses consumer interviews to rank
payment methods by transparency. Cash is considered the most salient, since
the money is measured out physically and the exact amount is articulated.
Check payments are slightly less salient, but the amount still has to be spelled
out in writing. Card payments are deemed to be considerably less salient,
and automated payments the least salient.6
Empirical evidence from consumer nance research indicates that the
salience of payments has real consequences for consumption patterns. Soman
(1999) nds that credit card users are more likely to underestimate, or forget
entirely, the amount spent on a recent purchase. Prelec and Simester (2001)
nd that subjects paying by credit card bid more for a prize. The reported
e¤ect is large around 100% and does not appear to be driven by liquidity
5Soman attributes the term pain of payingto Zellermayer (1996).
6Cash is the most transparent form of payment when one pays by cash, one sees
exactly what they are paying. (. . . ) At the opposite extreme, a completely opaque (non-
transparent) form of payment might be a payroll deduction that one is not even aware
of.(Soman, 2006, p. 175.)
13
constraints.7 The participants were MBA students at a prestigious business
school, making it hard to attribute this result to low levels of nancial literacy.
The research on salience in consumer nance points to a deeper behavioral
dimension of the consumption decision, namely the voluntary disassociation
of payment and consumption. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) suggest that
consumers may devise strategies for optimizing this decoupling of costs
and benets. Less salient payment methods facilitate this separation, thus
anaesthetizingthe consumer from the painful payment. This conjecture is
supported by Knutson et al (2007), who use functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to show that the purchasing decision activates two separate
regions in the brain. The nucleus accumbens is activated by the anticipated
gain (the enjoyment of the good), whereas the insula is activated, and the
mesial prefrontal cortex is deactivated, by excessive prices. The latter two
regions are associated with anticipated loss, suggesting that consumers ex-
perience a real pain of paying.
Some nancial arrangements may lend themselves more easily to the de-
coupling of costs and benets. When consumers choose between co-op apart-
7In two of the experiments, the prize was a pair of tickets to a sporting event; in one
experiment, a banner. The average bid increased by 113% and 76% respectively, for the
tickets, and 59% for the banner, when subjects were told they would pay by credit card.
(The variation is between-subject.)
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ments, they are also choosing between di¤erent capital structures. Prelec and
Loewenstein (1998) suggest that changes to the composition of an individ-
uals balance sheet may have hedonic e¤ects even when the economic e¤ects
are negligible. It is possible, and in our view plausible, that some consumers
add value by choosing a particular capital structure even when the economic
benets are small or negative.
The decoupling of costs and benets is a particular case of a more general
phenomenon: the mental accounting, whereby individuals compartmen-
talize elements of their consumption and the associated expenditures into
mental accounts, following personal rules or heuristics (Thaler, 1985). This
compartmentalization puts limits on the fungibility of money, and gives rise
to apparent ine¢ ciencies, as individuals fail to undertake some internal ar-
bitrage opportunities that in principle could increase utility(Thaler, 1985,
p.212). These ine¢ ciencies stem from the treatment of di¤erent elements of
consumption and expenditure as belonging to di¤erent realms, and not as
arguments of a single all-encompassing optimization problem. We argue, on
the basis of our survey results, that this is an apt description of consumer
behavior in the Swedish market for owner-occupied apartments.
Mental accounting may serve multiple purposes: on the one hand, it
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can be a tool for self-control that helps boundedly rational individuals make
reasonably good judgments (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008); on the other hand,
it allows individuals to picture nancial matters in a more palatable but
potentially ine¢ cient way. There is much room for conict between the two
goals, as an accurate representation is not necessarily the one that makes
the individual the most happy in the short run (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1998). In e¤ect, there is a trade-o¤between economic e¢ ciency and hedonic
e¢ ciency.
The mental accounting model in Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) predicts
that individuals would choose to pre-pay for consumption, because debt is
particularly unpleasant what the authors term debt aversion.8 But indi-
viduals do not always have this option. For housing, the savings required for
pre-payment may preclude purchasing a home for a large part of an adults
life. An alternative strategy is to mentally separate a debt from the good for
which it was incurred. Kamleitner and Kirchler (2006) study how loan users
mentally integrate or separate debt-nanced consumption and payment of
the debt. They nd a one-way connection from the loan to the good: the
8In the traditional economic analysis of consumer choice, consumers are assumed
to nance expenditures so as to minimize the present value of payments. (. . . ) The
psychological reality of payment decisions is more complicated. . . The rst and perhaps
most obvious complication is that debt is unpleasant. (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998,
p.5)
16
loan is associated with the good, making it more palatable, but the good
is not associated with the loan, and hence it is not tainted by the associ-
ated debt. The authors describe this as hedonically e¢ cient. Given the
prevalence of such behavior in credit markets, it seems highly plausible that
prospective apartment buyers would be attracted to a balance sheet mecha-
nism that allows them to make part of their mortgage less salient.
2.3 Financial Literacy
If co-op debt is less salient, and if consumers get disutility from salient debt,
then they raise their utility by choosing co-op debt over more salient, indi-
vidually held debt. If co-op debt is more costly, however, consumers should
weigh the psychological benets of less salient debt against the economic
costs. In practice, this entails having a clear understanding of the co-op
capital structure and of the current tax breaks. At the most practical level,
it also involves some calculations. We have reasons to believe that a non-
negligible fraction of consumers will struggle with some, or all, elements of
this process. Taken together, the psychological benets of less salient debt
and the inability to assess the costs of a sub-optimal capital structure may
generate a consumer bias in favour of co-op debt.
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Research on nancial literacy sheds more light on the limited ability of
many consumers to critically evaluate nancial problems or nancial prod-
ucts. With regard to consumer nance, two plausible causes of mistakes are
(1) a lack of familiarity with certain nancial products, and (2) numeracy
skills that are inadequate for some nancial calculations. A rapidly growing
body of research within household nance in general and nancial literacy
in particular o¤ers insights into both these factors. The ndings in this re-
search area make it increasingly di¢ cult to assume that households do not
make mistakes, even in relation to relatively simple nancial products.
There is ample evidence that many consumers have low levels of numeracy
and a poor understanding of nancial products. Banks and Oldeld (2006)
show that in a large sample of UK citizens close to retirement, a considerable
fraction are unable to perform even the most basic nancial calculations.9 In
their sample, numeracy is positively correlated with education and negatively
correlated with age. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) use a similar US sample
to evaluate the determinants of wealth close to retirement. Two thirds of
the sampled individuals have never tried to gure out how much they need
9The data in question is the 2002 wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA). The numeracy question included in our survey, and reported in section 3.4., is
based on one of their questions.
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to save for their old age. In a broader sample of US consumers, Hilgerth,
Hogarth and Beverly (2003) nd that less than half of the respondents report
using a spending plan or budget. Recent research by the O¢ ce for National
Statistics indicates that half of the adult population in the UK does not
have an understanding of basic mathematical concepts beyond addition and
subtraction (cf. Miles, 2003). Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) summarize the
results from a number of other surveys, and conclude that poor nancial
literacy is a widespread problem, in the US and elsewhere: Many households
are unfamiliar with even the most basic concepts needed to make sensible
saving and investment decisions(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b, p.1). They
nd large di¤erences between demographic groups, pointing to a link between
nancial literacy and inequality.10 Financial literacy has also been found to
decline strongly with old age (Laibson et al, 2008; Lusardi and Tufano, 2008).
A striking illustration of how widespread low numeracy might be is the
so called lottery questionused by Banks and Oldeld (2006) and Lusardi
and Mitchell (2007a). The question reads as follows: If 5 people all have the
winning number in the lottery and the prize is 2 million dollars, how much
will each of them get?In both samples, only just over half of the respondents
10The problems of low numeracy skills and low leves of nancial literacy is particularly
severe for Hispanics, blacks, women, and those with low levels of education.
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were able to answer the question correctly.11 We use a simplied version of
this question in our own survey. As reported in Section 3.4., our results are
broadly in line with theirs.
Consumers with a poor understanding of nancial products can protect
themselves by opting out of various markets. Mounting evidence is suggest-
ing, however, that non-participation is no panacea. For a start, households
may not realize that they are ill-equipped to make a particular nancial de-
cision: Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) nd strong signs of over-condence,
with households often overestimating their understanding of nancial mat-
ters. The lack of sophistication of many consumers who choose to participate
in nancial markets, and the importance of cost salience, is illustrated by a
number of recent experiments involving mutual funds. In one experiment,
50 current mutual fund investors were o¤ered a choice of 36 di¤erent com-
binations of load and management fee (Wilcox (2003). Investors typically
choose between funds with a highly salient front-end load and no-load funds
with higher, but arguably less salient, fees. Wilcox nds that investor choices
systematically overweight the more salient front-end loads, in direction con-
tradiction to normative economic theory.12 In a similar experiment, Choi
11Banks and Oldeld (2006): 50.8%; Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a): 55.9%.
12Specically: if an investor aims to hold the fund for X years, then a 1 basis point
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et al (2006) let subjects allocate an endowment across four S&P 500 index
funds with no active management but di¤erent fee structures. Subjects were
rewarded based on the subsequent performance of their portfolio.13 Partici-
pants were Harvard undergraduates andWharton MBA students. One would
expect them be nancially literate and have high numeracy skills. Despite
this, the vast majority inappropriately attached a lot of importance to re-
turns since inception, which for index funds depends only on the inception
date. Meanwhile, they neglected the negative impact of high fees: 95% of
the participants failed to minimize fees. This is consistent with Alexander et
al (1998), who nd that in a large survey sample of real-world mutual fund
investors, 81% could not give an estimate of the expenses of their mutual
funds, not even for the largest mutual fund in their holdings.14 Only 16%
thought that higher fees were negatively correlated with lower net returns,
whereas 20% thought the correlation was positive. (At the time, the cor-
relation between fees and net returns was negative. See Alexander et al,
increase in the annual fee is approximately tantamount to an X basis points increase in
the load. Wilcox (2003) nds that this rate of substitution for annual fee versus up-front
fee is about 2:1, despite a reported average holding time of 17 years. Not one out of 50
participants in the study reported a rate of substitution greater than 3.
13The investments were intermediated by the experimenters and the rewards only based
on returns; thus the choice of fund was unbundled from the services provided by the
fund.
14A majority (57%) also report that they did not know any of the expenses of their
largest fund at the time of purchase either.
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1998, p.310). 40% of those surveyed said they never used the mutual fund
prospectus.
Low levels of numeracy and nancial literacy can have serious conse-
quences for individual nancial well-being. Banks and Oldeld (2006) nd a
strong correlation between numeracy and pension savings (level and form).
They also nd a strong positive correlation between numeracy and wealth,
and between numeracy and owning shares or owning a private pension. The
correlations are robust to a number of controls, including other measures of
cognitive ability. The most numerate are also considerably more likely to
be well-informed about their pension arrangements. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007a) report a strong correlation between planning for retirement and net
wealth. Planning, in turn, is largely carried out by the more nancially lit-
erate. Lusardi and Tufano (2008) nd systematic evidence that individuals
with lower levels of nancial literacy transact at higher costs. Stango and
Zinman (2008) nd that individuals who are more prone to payment/interest
bias tend to borrow more and save less. In a South African eld experiment,
Bertrand et al (2005) show that nancially irrelevant information can be an
important determinant of consumer borrowing. A short-term loan o¤er dif-
fered in the interest rate o¤ered and in terms of other, non-economic framing
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(what the authors term psychological manipulation). The non-economic
manipulations had a sizeable average e¤ect on the take-up rate, equivalent to
half a percentage point change in the interest rate implying that consumers
that are a¤ected by irrelevant information may be paying a high price for
this.
2.4 Do Irrational Agents A¤ect Equilibrium Prices?
While individual mistakes clearly a¤ect individual outcomes, it is less evident
that irrational actors can a¤ect the market equilibrium. Some market condi-
tions under which this may occur are described by Akerlof and Yellen (1985),
who characterize equilibria where the presence of non-maximizing behavior,
alongside standard maximization, results in a rst-order change in equilib-
rium values, but only second-order small losses for the non-maximizers. In
such cases, they argue, mistakes may go uncorrected. Russell and Thaler
(1985) o¤er a broader description of conditions under which mistakes may
prevail in equilibrium: costless arbitrage may not be possible, and evolution-
ary forces (the selection and propagation of advantageous strategies) may
be weaker for households than for rms: quasi rationality is rarely fatal
(Russel and Thaler, 1985, p.1074). In their view, the classical response, that
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competition will make irrationality irrelevant for equilibrium, only holds in
very special cases, probably rarely observed in the real world.(Russell and
Thaler, 1985, p.1071). We note that rent control prevents large scale ar-
bitrage in the Swedish market for co-op apartments. Moreover, mispricing
in this market is unlikely to drive individual households out of the market
altogether, i.e., their is little selective pressure on household behavior.
In some cases, market forces will correct for mistakes and reach the ra-
tional equilibrium. This might not necessarily be the case, however. For
example, if a rm is exploiting a widespread psychological bias, a competi-
tor may inform the public about the bias and hence reveal the exploitation.
Under certain market conditions, however, it is not protable for the com-
petitor to educate the clients of other rms. In this case, de-biasing will not
occur there is a curse of de-biasing(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; see also
Russel and Thaler, 1985). Because of the size of the Swedish market for
owner-occupied apartments, and the limits on arbitrage, we nd it unlikely
that any agent would be able to internalize the benets of educating naive
agents in this manner to the extent where it would o¤set the costs of doing
so.
There is mounting empirical evidence of systematic sub-optimization in
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nancial markets. Ausubel (1991) reports a large and persistent discrepancy
between credit card rates and the cost of funds. Despite excellent potential
to be a competitive market, and thus to function as a continuous spot market
for credit, credit card lending rates were highly sticky throughout the 1980s
despite large uctuations in the costs of lendable funds. Search and switch
costs appear insu¢ cient to explain the phenomenon: the average consumer in
the sample has a $250 surplus to be extracted by switching to a competitive
rate. Ausubel also points out that credit card marketers have reported a
much greater sensitivity to the more salient annual fee than to a less salient
hike in the interest rate.
Stango and Zinman (2008) document a widespread and systematic misun-
derstanding of the interest rate associated with a given principle and loan re-
payment schedule what they term payment/interest bias. They attribute
this to the di¢ culties many individuals have with exponentiation. The au-
thors emphasize that the use of fuzzy math  heuristics for dealing with
complex mathematical problems is common, and that this just happens to
be an instance where the fuzzy math is systematically biased in one direction
toward saving less and borrowing more. In Stango and Zinman (2007) use
variation in enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) across time
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and between lenders to show that lenders exploit payment/interest bias by
shrouding their interest rates.
Wilson andWaddams Price (2006) nd that a large share of consumers do
not switch to the cheapest provider in the UK energy market. Aggravating
matters further, many of those that switch do so incorrectly, incurring higher
costs as a result. This is not easily explained by search costs.
2.5 Behavioral Factors in the Housing Market
Behavioral research on the housing market has slowly been gaining momen-
tum. For decades, Robert Schiller has been studying individual attitudes
toward the housing market with the assumption that these attitudes need
not be rational in a narrow, economic sense (for an overview, see Shiller,
2005). In particular, individuals are prone to both wishful thinking, as in
the form of extrapolation of positive price trends, and errors. Shiller stresses
that housing prices, in aggregate, need not be e¢ cient.
Recent empirical work in real estate nance lends support to the hy-
pothesis that irrational actors may a¤ect equilibrium prices in the housing
market. This work tests for particular biases that have been documented in
economics and psychology, such as loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001),
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and money illusion (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2005).15
Both of these studies nd that psychological biases have signicant ex-
planatory power when it comes to understanding housing market dynamics.
Psychological biases may even have more explanatory power than traditional
economic variables: Genesove and Mayer note that a large part of the ef-
fect of liquidity constraints reported in a previous study disappears when
controlling for loss aversion.
A market in which psychological variables are important determinants
of behavior is unlikely to be perfectly rational. Brunnermeier and Julliard
(2005) explicitly link their analysis to housing market bubbles, in that nomi-
nal interest rates closely follow the trends in mispricing, whereas the real in-
terest rate does not. Moreover, the loss aversion e¤ect reported in Genesove
and Mayer (2001) is larger for owner-occupants than for investors. This
suggests that the resulting ine¢ ciencies could be even larger in Sweden,
where the market for owner-occupied apartments is completely dominated
by owner-occupants.
Determining the right price for a house or an apartment is a complicated
15For experimental/survey evidence and a general discussion of loss aversion and money
illusion, see, respectively, Kahneman and Tversky (1991) and Shar, Diamond, and Tver-
sky (1997).
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task, as is the selection of an optimal mortgage. Given this, it is not surprising
that in addition to indications of systematic biases, there is also mounting
evidence of ignorance and outright mistakes in the housing market. Miles
(2003) reports a large share of the UK mortgage market is characterized
by bounded rationality and myopia, including a survey that found 10% of
respondents did not even know if their mortgage was variable or xed rate
(see Miles, 2003, p.45). Consumers do not have a good understanding of the
products, and focus very heavily on the current, moving rate. Risk proles
of mortgage products play a secondary role. In the US, households are slow
to renance their debt in the face of declining interest rates and particularly
slow to do so if they have low levels of nancial literacy (Campbell, 2006).
The costs are large: about 1/5 of households pay more than 2% above the
current interest rate. These costs are too high to be easily explained in
terms of transaction costs. Campbell (2006) also reports indications that
many households choose their mortgage product (xed rate or adjustable
rate) on non-economic grounds.
If individuals struggle with choosing the right mortgage when there is
only one source of debt, then we nd it highly plausible that mistakes will
ourish in a market where there are two sources of debt and co-ops di¤er
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with regard to their capital structure.
3 A Survey of Co-op Residents
As a prelude to our analysis of the market for co-op apartments, we con-
ducted a survey of co-op residents that allowed us to better understand how
individuals view the apartment nancing problem. Participants were asked
about their mortgages and about the debt of their co-ops. We also asked
them if they had considered the possibility of substituting individually held
debt for the co-op debt. They were also asked some questions testing how well
they understood the regulations regarding co-ops. In particular, we checked
whether they were aware of the tax shield di¤erence between the two sources
of nancing. We asked some general background questions, including how
long they had lived, and were planning to live, in their apartment. We also
asked a question intended to check their numeracy skills. The following sec-
tion focuses on our key questions and the associated ndings. We would like
to emphasize that the purpose of the survey was to look for indications of
mental accounting, or some other bias, that would lead our sample of co-op
residents to have a less-than-fully-rational view of the co-op capital structure.
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It is beyond the scope of this to identify the determinants of such behavior.
The survey was conducted in February 2008, at the main train station
in Stockholm. Participation in the survey was conditional on owning, and
being resident in, a co-op apartment. 100 individuals took part in the survey,
which lasted approximately 3 minutes. Participants were rewarded with a
lottery ticket worth approximately USD4. The mean age of the participants
was 45 years, with a minimum of 17 and a mamixum of 77. The sex ratio of
participants was exactly 1:1. All but one of the participants had graduated
from high school, and about two thirds of the sample had attended univer-
sity. Approximately one third of the participants had current or previous
experience of being on the board of a co-op.
Below we present our four main ndings from the survey. (1) Respondents
had a high awareness of the size of their mortgage and the interest rate they
pay on it. (2) By contrast, respondents had a low awareness of the size of
co-op debt, and the interest rate paid by the co-op. (3) Respondents were
highly aware of the tax shield di¤erential between individually held debt and
co-op debt. (4) Most respondents had never thought about the possibility of
substituting individually held debt for co-op debt.
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3.1 Debt Awareness
We asked survey participants if they knew the size of their own mortgage,
and the interest rate they were paying. As shown in Figure 1, the great
majority knew the exact size of their mortgage and the exact interest rate
they were paying. Of those that did not know the exact numbers, about half
knew them approximately. Only 5% of the partcipants in the survey did not
even approximately know the size of their mortgage, and only 13% did not
even approximately know the interest rate on their mortgage.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
By contrast, only a minority of the participants in the survey knew how
much debt their co-op had taken on, or what interest rate the co-op was
paying. 60% of respondents did not even approximately know how much
debt their co-op had, and 76% did not even approximately know the interest
rate the co-op was paying.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
These ndings lead us to conclude that debt awareness is considerable
higher for individually held debt than for co-op debt, despite the fact that
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both sources of debt-nancing are paid for by the co-op resident. This pat-
tern is entirely consistent with our conjecture that a large fraction of the
population may be compartmentalizing co-op debt in a less than fully ratio-
nal manner. Such mental accounting would imply that for many consumers,
co-op debt does not enter into calculations of the value of an apartment in
an appropriate way.
3.2 Tax Shield Awareness
At the time of writing, interest payments on household mortgages are tax
deductible. For interest payments up to a specied threshold, 30% of the
payment may be deducted from the individuals income tax. For interest
payments in excess of this amount, the deduction is 21%.16 By contrast,
interest payments on debt held by a co-op are not tax deductible. The
Swedish mortgage market is highly competitive, so the di¤erence between
the interest rates faced by co-ops and individuals is negligible. Assuming no
di¤erence in gross interest rates, the net cost of capital raised through the
co-op is r, whereas the net cost of capital raised through an individually held
mortgage is 0:7r. If individuals are well-informed about the di¤erence with
16At the time of writing, the threshold is SEK 100,000, equivalent to about USD 12,500.
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regard to the tax shield, they should seek to reduce co-op debt in favour of
individual debt. Debt substitution of this kind has not been occurring to any
great extent. In the survey, we investigated the possibility that individuals
simply were unaware of the tax shield di¤erential. This does not seem to be
the case.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
As shown in Figure 3, a great majority of respondents were aware of
the fact that interest payments on their own mortgages are tax deductible.
The great majority were also aware of the fact that interest payments made
through the co-op, as a part of the monthly fee, are not tax deductible. 91%
correctly identied the rst statement as true, and 82% correctly identied
the second statement as false.17 We conclude on the basis of this that there
is a high awareness of the tax shield di¤erential between the two sources of
nancing.
17The option I dont know was not o¤ered. Uncertain individuals were asked to
indicate which response they thought was more likely to be correct.
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3.3 Awareness of Debt Substitution
To a large extent, debt held by the co-op and debt held individually by its
members are substitutes.18 In our survey, we wanted to investigate to what
extent co-op residents were aware of this.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
As shown in Figure 4, the awareness of the possibility of substituting
co-op debt for individually held debt was very low. 86% of respondents had
never considered the possibility of doing this. Individuals with experience of
being on the board of a co-op were more than twice as likely to have thought
about this (22% versus 9%). The di¤erence is marginally signicant (Pearson
chi-squared test; p-value 0.076).
3.4 Numeracy
At the end of the survey, we included the following question: How much
is 2 million divided by 5?. This question is a slightly simplied version
18They are not perfect substitutes, for several reasons. (1) Some households may face
credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing directly from the bank. (2) Co-op
debt has limited liability in the case of default. The nature of the Swedish mortgage market
makes (1) an unlikely explanation for a widespread bias toward co-op debt. Moreover, for
loan-to-value ratios of 80% or less (2) is not a convincing explanation. Large price increases
in recent years imply that LTV ratios are typically much lower.
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of the so called lottery questionused by Banks and Oldeld (2006) and
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and discussed in section 2.4. The question is
intended to test the respondentsnumeracy skills. Respondents were given
as much time as they needed to answer the question. If they came up with
the wrong answer, but then corrected themselves, we still counted this as a
correct answer. Even under these conditions only 67% of respondents were
able to answer the question correctly. This gure will probably strike some
readers as surprisingly low, but it is actually slightly higher than the fraction
of correct answers found in the two previous studies that use the lottery
question (50.8% and 55.9% respectively). The di¤erence may be explained
in part by the slightly simpler phrasing in our survey, or by the fact that
participation in our survey was conditional on owning an apartment, which
may be positively correlated with numeracy skills.
We wish to emphasize the poignancy of this nding: as we have men-
tioned, our sample consisted of adults owning, and residing in, co-op apart-
ments. One third of the sample were unable to divide 2 million by 5 without
using an aid. In our view, this suggests that many individuals who face quite
complicated nancial decisions may not have adequate skills for making any-
thing like the optimal decision. Taken together with our other survey ndings
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reported above, this makes it highly plausible that a sizeable fraction of co-op
residents will be making sub-optimal nancial judgments about co-op capital
structures, which is a considerably more complicated problem.19
As a word of caution, we note that the survey does not prove that seriously
awed decisions are being made. Nonetheless, we have shown that when
given the opportunity to reveal their full understanding of the problem at
hand, a reasonably representative sample of apartment-owners failed to do
anything of the sort. Rather, the survey results are highly consistent with
our conjecture that a considerable share of market participants do not have
an economically sound understanding of co-op capital structures.
4 A Simple Model of the Co-op Market
4.1 Modeling Consumer Bias
Mental accounting and low levels of nancial literacy can give rise to economic
behavior that departs from the predictions of standard economic models.
This raises the question of whether a formal model should aim to take such
behavioral considerations into account  and if so, how? It is crucial to
19Our measure of numeracy is positively correlated with awareness of the substitutability
of debt, but the correlation (0.16) is not very strong.
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distinguish whether such behavior is deemed to be irrational. Economic
behavior is typically described as rational if it conforms to the predictions
of normative theory. But modelling itself does not require such rationality.
According to one inuential denition, a positive theory of economic decision-
making is one which generates good predictions regarding economic behavior
(Friedman, 1953).
When the departures from normative theory are systematic, the behavior
is quasi-rationalin the sense of being predictably irrational (Thaler, 1980;
Russell and Thaler, 1985; Ariely 2008). A widespread psychological bias
is exactly the kind of systematic deviation from normative prediction that
lends itself to economic modelling, which should be thought of as extensions
of, and complements to, standard normative models.
We have reason to believe that there is a systematic bias in the market
for owner-occupied apartments, in favour of co-op debt. This debt has the
advantage of being less salient, which may give rise to psychological benets.
Calculating the real cost of choosing co-op debt vs. individually held debt
is demanding in terms of nancial literacy. This makes it unlikely that all
households fully understand the costs of co-op debt, and a biased perception
of the relative cost of the two sources of debt nancing may arise.
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One approach for modelling quasi-rational behavior is to treat it as a
mistake that occurs when the agent converts raw information into a budget
set (Russell and Thaler, 1985). This allows for a distinction between individ-
ual di¤erences in (1) preferences, (2) information, and (3) the mapping from
the real world to the mental representation of a budget constraint. Having
arrived at a not-quite-accurate budget set, the agent optimizes in the same
way that a rational agent would.
The model outlined in this section follows a similar approach: we assume
that some buyers  the naive agents  have a biased perception of the
relative cost of the two sources of debt nancing. In the model, the bias takes
the form of an additional psychological cost associated with individually held
debt. Aside from this, both naive and sophisticated buyers solve the same
optimization problem.
4.2 A Model with two Types
There is a continuum of apartments a 2 [0; 1] and agents i 2 [0; 1], that live
for two periods. Each of the agents considers purchasing an apartment at
the beginning of period one. Agents have zero initial wealth and borrow to
nance the purchase. There are two sources of debt-nancing, individually
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held debt and co-op debt. Throughout the following analysis, we will refer to
individually held debt as equity and to debt held through the co-op as debt.
Period 1. The initial purchase in period 1 is nanced through any
combination of equity and debt, i.e., the agents choose capital structures
for their apartments. Normalizing the price of the apartment to 1, we can
denote the capital structure associated with a given equity level E with a
pair fE; 1   Eg, where 1   E represents the fraction of debt. Let the gross
interest rate r be the same for both equity and debt. 20 Suppose that the cost
of capital is tax deductible for equity but not for debt, and that all agents
understand this di¤erence when considering the optimal capital structure.
Letting  denote the tax rate, the net cost of a unit of capital raised as
equity is (1  )r.
Some agents get disutility from the higher salience of equity, and fail to
perceive that the resulting capital structure is sub-optimal, and therefore,
costly.. We model this bias as a psychological cost cj that is proportional to
the interest paid on equity. Fraction  of all agents are sophisticated (type
j = 1) and do not perceive a psychological cost (c1 = 0). Fraction 1   
are naive (type j = 2) and do perceive a psychological cost(c2 = c > 0).21
20This is innocuous for the predictions of the model
21Alternatively, this could be modeled as a psychological benet from the less salient
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The net benet associated with equity level E is the tax shield less the
psychological cost, where the cost is modeled as a convex function of the
amount of equity E. We denote the benet by bj :
bj(E)  rE   r(1  )cjE2 (1)
where c1 = 0 and c2 > 0.
We will see later on, that the existence of the two types of agents brings
about two levels of capitals structure: Sophisticated agents choose the capital
structure fEh; 1 Ehg, and naive agents choose fEl; 1 Elg, where Eh > El.
Period 2. The capital structures chosen for any given apartment cannot
be changed in period 2 and remains xed throughout the lives of the agents.
At the beginning of period 2, however, agents may wish to trade their apart-
ments for other apartments (with possibly di¤erent capital structures). This
realistic phenomenon in the housing market is driven by the unanticipated
i.i.d. shock vai for every agent i, with uniform distribution on [ V; V ] across
the apartments, that the agent utilizes when matched with an apartment.22
co-op debt. Since we are only concerned with the relative cost of the two debt sources,
such an approach is equivalent to ours.
22Such unanticipated factors maybe related to loss or change of jobs, marriage or divorce,
changes in family size or other factors that may prompt the families to seek for apartments
with other conditions.
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Furthermore, the incentive to trade is e¤ected by the relative prices of the
apartments: Because the (perceived) cost of equity di¤ers from the cost of
debt, the price of an apartment at period 2 depends on its capital structure.
The price is given by the function P (E), and we assume that agents are not
nancially constrained (can borrow further).23 Thus, when an agent of type
j buys an apartment a with equity Eh, it receives vai   P (Eh) + bj(Eh).
Each type chooses the capital structure that maximizes their benets
throughout their lives. Thus, we will see that the relative supply of apart-
ments with the two di¤erent equity structures is determined by the propor-
tion of the two types of agent in the marketplace: ; 1   . In order to
choose an apartment, agents make m = 2 searches at the beginning of period
2.24 We assume that when searching an agent views one apartment of either
capital structure type. Our results do not hinge on this assumption - all
we need is that apartments are su¢ ciently idiosyncratic that a full separa-
tion, whereby either agent type trades only with itself, does not occur. The
23We will abstract from the following aspects: (1) Co-op screening. The co-op has veto
rights over new members, but in Sweden these rights are very weak. (2) Pros and cons
of the co-op versus other forms of ownership. In Sweden, owner-occupied apartments
are without exception organized as co-ops. The condominium ownership structure is not
permitted. Thus, we take the co-op ownership structure as exogenously given. (3) Default.
Rising prices over the last decade have resulted in lower LTV-ratios for co-ops. When the
leverage is moderate, default is highly unlikely. For this reason we will abstract from the
di¤erence between the two forms of nancing in the case of default.
24The model is tractable for a general number of searches, but this does not o¤er further
insight.
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idiosyncratic shock captures this realistic feature.
In summary, agents live for two periods. At the beginning of period 1
they make their initial purchase for which they choose a capital structure that
maximizes their benets throughout their lives. After living in the apartment
for one period, agents search for new apartments at the beginning of period
2. If they nd an apartment that suits them even better they trade. If not,
they remain in the same apartment in the second period.
4.3 Determining the Price
Because the shock in the second period is assumed to be unanticipated,
agents do not foresee any willingness to trade in the second period. thus
capital structure is chosen in the rst period based on the perceived trade-
o¤: tax shields vs. psychological costs. We then go on to see how agents
decide on trading their apartments once they have chosen capital structures.
4.3.1 Period 1: Choosing the capital structure
When choosing capital structures, agents maximize their tax benets, less
the psychological cost of equity.
Proposition 1 Naive agents choose a lower level of equity, relative to so-
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phisticated agents, when determining their capital structures in period 1.
Proof Naive agents weigh the tax benets of equity against the psycho-
logical cost:
max
E
rE   r(E + (1  E))  cE2 (2)
From the rst-order condition we get the optimal level of equity for naive
agents:
El =
r
2c
(3)
while sophisticated agents prefer not to hold any debt at all, since they
maximize.
max
E
rE   r(E + (1  E)) (4)
Thus, Eh = 1; Dh = 025
4.3.2 Period 2: Trading
The equilibrium price equates supply and demand for apartments of both
types of capital structure. The supply of Eh and El apartments is determined
25One could internalize the optimal choice of equity by imposing a nonlinear cost of
raising it. While such an assumption would be innocuous and more realistic, it does not
add insight in our model, since our interest lies in the workings of the trade in period 2
for any high and low equity apartments chosen by agents.
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in period 1 and is given by  and 1   , respectively. Below, we calculate
the demand in several steps.
By assumption each agent considers one apartment with high equity and
one with low equity during apartment search. Both types may settle for an
apartment with high or low equity, whichever gives them the higher utility
given the realization of the random variable v. Suppose for simplicity that the
individual utility that agents maximize is the monetary payo¤M : ui(M) =
M . Then an agent of type j will trade their initial purchase for an apartment
of equity level Eh if both conditions below are satised
vai   Ph + bj(Eh) > vE0   P0 + bj(E0) (5)
and
vai   Ph + bj(Eh) > va
0
i   Pl + bj(El) (6)
where a0 denotes the low equity apartment, and a the high equity apart-
ment. Ph, Pl and P0are the prices of high equity, low equity and the initial
apartments, respectively. The parameter bj is the net benet of equity. Con-
dition (5) states that the agent will move to a new apartment if the sum of
the utility from living in the new apartment and the net benets associated
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with its capital structure, less the cost Ph of purchasing the new apartment,
is greater than what the agent earns by staying in the initial purchase (sub-
script 0).
The probability that a sophisticated agent trades a high equity apartment
for another high equity apartment in the second period is
h1  Pfvai   Ph + Ehb1 > va
0
i   Pl + Elb1g  Pfvai > v0g (7)
where the last term is calculated from (1) for type j = 1.
Similarly, the probability that the agent will stay in their current Eh
apartment is
01  Pfv0   Ph + Ehb1 > va
0
i   Pl + Elb1g  Pfvai < v0g (8)
The total demand by agents of type j = 1 for high equity apartments
is h1 = 
h
1 + 
0
1: The demand for low equity apartments 
h
1 is calculated
similarly. Demand by j = 2 for low and high equity apartments (l2 and 
h
2)
is constructed analogously.
The equilibrium price equates supply and demand in the market for high
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equity apartments:
h1 + (1  )h2 =  (9)
where  is the proportion of sophisticated agents, as before. Similarly, the
equilibrium price equates supply and demand for the low equity apartments:
l1 + (1  )l2 = 1   (10)
where l2 = P
l
2 + P
0
2 , analogous to the total demand for high equity
apartments.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price of high equity apartments is given by
Ph = Pl   2V + V + (Eh   El)
 
rt  (1  )c2(1  r)(Eh + El)

(11)
Proof : See Appendix A. Note that the price is decreasing in the psycho-
logical cost c2, which causes the price of high equity apartments to be lower
than the price of low equity apartments. This is consistent with our survey
nding that many agents indeed do not consider substituting equity for debt,
even though they understand the tax advantages of equity. The prevalence
of such behavior in the market decreases the price of high equity apartments
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compared to what one would observe given the favorable tax treatment of
equity relative to debt.26
Proposition 3 The price response to a change in the tax advantage of equity
relative to debt is smaller when some agents are naive than in their absence
(the fully rational case).
Proof: In an economy without naive agents, i.e., when c = 0 and/or
 = 1,
@(Ph   Pl)
@
= (Eh   El)r (12)
which is larger, in absolute terms, than the response that the model
predicts when cj > 0 for at least one type j, and  < 1:
@(Ph   Pl)
@
=  (Eh El)
 
r  (1 )c(1 r)(Eh+El)

>  (Eh El)r (13)
In other words, if there are naive agents in the market, then we expect
equilibrium prices to be less responsive to a change in the relative cost of the
two sources of nancing. We explore this hypothesis in the rst empirical
analysis section.
26Note that the price di¤erential is not necessarily decreasing with :
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4.3.3 Probability of moving out
Proposition 4 If naive agents dominate the market (0 <  < 0:5), sophis-
ticated agents have lower probability of moving out from their apartments.
Moreover, an increase in the psychological cost parameter c results in a de-
creased probability of moving for all, but this e¤ect is stronger for sophisti-
cated agents.
@01
@c
 @
0
2
@c
> 0 (14)
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is that when a large number of prospective
buyers dislike the high equity apartments, sophisticated agents will not re-
ceive enough compensation from selling in relation to the expected gains. In
a multi-period model where apartments can be traded in several periods, the
lower probability of trade in each period means that the likelihood that an
agent nds an appropriate apartment for trade is lower. We test the conjec-
ture that sophisticated agents stay longer in their apartments in the second
empirical analysis section.
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Sales Data
If all agents in the market are sophisticated, co-op debt should be fully cap-
italized in apartment prices. Increasing an apartments share of co-op debt
should lower the price by the same amount. We conjecture that this is not an
accurate description of the Swedish market for co-op apartments. Our survey
ndings suggest that a boundedly rational view of co-op capital structures
may be pervasive in the market. In this section we use a large sample of
market data to shed more light on this conjecture.
Due to the particular legal status of Swedish co-ops, there is no central-
ized, publically available data on their capital structures. Instead, we use
the monthly fee, which we can observe in our data set, as a proxy for co-op
debt. While heterogeneity with regard to the service ow provided by co-ops
makes this proxy variable less than perfect, we have reason to believe that it
is still reasonably good. There are a few rms in Sweden that specialize in
analyzing co-op annual reports, including the balance sheets. One of these
rms, Boreda AB, allowed us to estimate the correlation between the fee/m2
and co-op debt/m2 on their data for 2007. The correlation coe¢ cient for
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this subsample is about 0.40. When controlling for year of construction (as
we do in the following analysis), the correlation rises to about 0.66. On the
basis of this, we assume that the correlation between the monthly fee/m2
and debt/m2 is reasonably strong also in the national sample of sales data
used below.
Since we do not directly observe debt, we cannot measure how debt a¤ects
prices by simply regressing price/m2 on fee/m2. If the service ow in the co-
op is positively correlated with the co-op fee, then the e¤ect of a higher fee
on prices is ambiguous. As a result, a regression coe¢ cient on the co-op fee
does not lend itself to a straight-forward interpretation.
Instead, we make use of a natural experiment to examine whether co-op
debt is capitalized in a rational manner. On 16 October 2006, the government
unexpectedly announced that it would abolish a supplementary housing tax
levied on co-ops. At the time, all co-ops were required to pay a basic housing
tax amounting to 0.5 percent of the assessed value of the property. In addition
to the basic housing tax, co-ops paid a 28 percent tax on the imputed rent,
calculated as 3 percent of the assessed value, less co-op interest payments.
The enactment date of the tax change, 1 January 2007, was disclosed at the
time of the announcement.
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The crucial aspect of the reform is that had di¤erent e¤ects for co-ops
with high and low leverage. Interest rate payments made by the co-op were
deductible against this tax. Hence co-ops with high fractions of debt did not
pay the tax, and would not be a¤ected by the reform. By contrast, co-ops
with little or no debt would enjoy considerable cost reductions as soon as the
reform was implemented at the end of the year.
Forward-looking, rational consumers should have anticipated that co-ops
with low leverage would either (1) reduce their monthly charges in the fu-
ture, or (2) maintain the same monthly charge but increase the ow of ser-
vices. Thus, in an e¢ cient market we would expect a positive price e¤ect
for apartments in low debt co-ops. To separate this e¤ect from general price
movements, we focus our attention on changes in the relative price of low
debt and high debt co-ops around the time of the reform. In an e¢ cient
market, this relative price should have changed in favour of co-ops with low
levels of debt.
We test this hypothesis using market data on apartment sales from the
fourth quarter of 2006, around the time of the reform. The data was pro-
vided by the Swedish association of real estate agents, and contains detailed
information on more than three thousand apartment sales that took place
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throughout the country within a +=  30 day window of the reform. The
data distinguishes between the transaction date and the moving date. We
use the former to divide the sample into pre-reform and post-reform sales.
The data also allows us to control for a number of apartment characteris-
tics, including the monthly fee, apartment size, the number of rooms, what
oor, the age of the building, whether the building has an elevator, and the
location. Location is measured at the municipal level.
5.2 The Econometric Model
We t a hedonic model with the sales price as the dependent variable. We
include the co-op fee per square meter as an explanatory variable, as well as
a dummy variable for being a post-reform sale, and an interaction term for
the co-op fee and the post-reform dummy. The fee, which we can observe,
is a proxy for co-op debt, which we do not observe. Co-ops with higher fees
are assumed, ceteris paribus, to have higher debt levels. We can write our
econometric model as
yi = 0 + 1feei + 2posti + 3feei  posti +X0i + "i (15)
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where the dependent variable, y, is the sales price (per m2), fee is the (annu-
alized, per m2) co-op fee, post is a dummy variable indicating a post-reform
sale, and X is a vector of apartment characteristics.
We are primarily interested in the coe¢ cient 3. More debt should result
in a lower price both before and after the reform, but the negative e¤ect of co-
op debt should be larger after the reform, which made such debt more costly
relative to equity. The coe¢ cient 3 captures this di¤erence-in-di¤erence.
5.3 A Rational Benchmark
In this section, we estimate a benchmark value for 3 in a market where all
agents are rational. For a rational agent, the utility ow from an apartment
is not a¤ected by the co-ops capital structure. Hence the ow cost that a
rational individual is willing to pay for the apartment should be the same
regardless of the capital structure. Letting V , D, and E denote the value of
assets, debt and equity, and a, b, and c their respective cost, we can write
this condition as
aV = bD + cE
) E = a
c
V   b
c
D
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The rst derivative of E w.r.t. D gives the marginal rate of substitution
between debt and equity such that the agent is indi¤erent between di¤erent
capital structures:
MRSD;E =
@E
@D
=  b
c
Before the reform, b0  c0 = (1   )r ) MRS0  1. After the reform,
b1 > c1 )MRS1 > 1:More precisely, b1 = r whereas c1 = (1 )r as before,
implying
MRS1 =   r
(1  )r =  
1
(1  )
In other words, the post-reform marginal rate of subsitution for a rational
individual is such that a marginal increase of one unit of debt reduces equity
by 1=(1  ) units. The fee, however, is a proxy for the interest payment on
the debt, rD, not the principal D. We must adjust for this when estimating
the coe¢ cient 3. In the simplest of worlds, a marginal increase of one unit
of interest paid implies an additional 1=r units of debt. It follows that the
marginal rate of substition between interest payments on co-op debt and the
level of equity is given by
MRSrD;E =   1
(1  ) 
1
r
=   1
(1  )r
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We know that  = 0:3. Reasonable estimates of r for the second half of
2006 are in the range of 0:05, approximately corresponding to STIBOR +
2%. Table 1 below shows a range of estimates of our rational benchmark, i.e.,
the e¤ect size if the market responded e¢ ciently to the reform. The e¤ect
size is expressed in absolute terms.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
5.4 Regression Results
We t Equation (15) to sales data within a window of +=  30 days of the
announcement of the reform. In addition, we t the model to more narrow
windows of 10 and 20 days. A more narrow window reduces the scope for
other, background variables, e.g., macroeconomic variables, to bias the re-
sults, but also results in a smaller sample. The estimates for the key variables
are reported in Table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
For the 10-day window the coe¢ cient on the interaction term, our key
variable of interest, has the wrong sign and is not statistically signicant.
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For the 20 and 30 days windows, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term has
the appropriate, negative sign, but despite the large sample size and high
R-squared, it remains far from statistically signicant. This suggests that
the market did not react e¢ ciently to the reform, in the sense of prices that
incorporate all available public information. This nding is consistent with
our survey results, which suggest that a large fraction of the market may not
have a good understanding of the co-op capital structure.
Consistent with the prediction of our model, we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis that there was no relative price change following the reform.
The sales data for the period preceding and immediately following the reform
do not indicate that market capitalizes co-op debt in an e¢ cient manner.
While it is not possible to prove a negative, the large sample size and good
explanatory power of our regressions using the sales data suggest that what
e¢ ciency might be in the market is weak at best.
5.5 Robustness Check: Supply E¤ects
Price is set by demand and supply. It is possible that supply changes a¤ected
the equilibrium price, perhaps o¤setting a change in demand. We check this
by comparing the mean and variance of fees observed during the 30 days
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preceding the reform with those observed during the 30 days immediately
following the reform.
As table 3 shows, there was little di¤erence between the two periods
with regard to the mean and variance of the annual fee variable. The mean
declined slightly and the variance increased marginally. A two-sample t-
test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal means (p-value: 0.52).
The equality of variance between the two periods is tested using the Levene
statistic. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal variance (p-
value: 0.99).
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
5.6 Survey Data
The extended version of our model predicts that for a range of , sophisti-
cated agents will be less mobile. Our survey data o¤ers an opportunity to
test this hypothesis. One of the survey questions was how many years the
respondent expected to reside in their current apartment. Responses ranged
from less to one year to for the rest of my life.27 In order to examine
27In the latter case, a numerical value was imputed according to the formula A=B-C,
where A is the imputed value, B is a constant representing a normalexpected lifespan,
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whether duration of residence was correlated with sophistication regarding
the capital structure, we needed some measure of sophistication. The sur-
vey also included a question about whether the individual had ever thought
about the two forms of debt as being, to some extent, substitutes. We use a
positive answer to this question as a proxy for being sophisticated.
There is a considerable di¤erence between naives and sophisticates in our
sample with regard to how long they expect to stay in their apartments.
The former expect, on average, to stay for 7.2 more years, whereas the latter
expect to stay more than twice as long, 14.7 years. Our sample is small:
only 14 of the 100 respondents replied positively to the question about debt
substitution. Moreover, the apparent correlation could be driven by other
variables. To shed more light on the statistical signicance of this nding
and on the role of other variables, we regress the expected residency on a
number of controls, including age, sex and education. We also control for
how long the repondent had already lived at their apartment. We can write
and C is the respondents age at the time of the survey. For the results presented below,
B=85. Additional regression with B=80 and B=90 can be found in Appendix X. Our
analysis is not particularly sensitive to the selected value of B, although for B=90 the
p-value is a little over 0.05.
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this regression as
yi = 0 + 1residencyi + 2agei + 2sex+ 2education+ "i (16)
Table 4 presents the results from tting Equation (16) to our survey sample.
Column (1) shows the estimated correlation from a simple regression without
controls, and column (2) shows the regression estimates when we include the
controls.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
In the simple regression without controls, the (positive) coe¢ cient on So-
phisticated is highly statistically signicant. When we include the control
variables, the explanatory power increases considerably, but the coe¢ cient
on Sophisticated remains similar in magnitude - implying that sophisti-
cated individuals stay for about 7 years longer, on average - and continues to
be statistically signicant. While one should be cautious when drawing in-
ference from such a small sample, this nding nevertheless provides support
for the models prediction.
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6 Discussion
We have used a survey to identify a consumer bias and shown that it can have
economically signicant e¤ects for individual welfare as well as equilibrium
prices, in both theory and practice. The bias in question is the tendency to
compartmentalize two closely related sources of debt as if they were not part
of the same nancing problem. Looking at the market for owner-occupied
apartments, we argue that the lower salience of co-op debt, in combination
with low levels of nancial literacy, gives rise to a bias in favour of co-op debt.
Because many households do not fully comprehend co-op capital structures,
they do not fully perceive the costs of failing to optimize the composition
of their debt. As a result, the distortionary e¤ects of lower salience are left
largely unchecked.
The bias gives rise to sub-optimal capital structures, and may thereby
impose substantial costs on individual households. We o¤er the following
numerical example. Following the 2006 reform, co-op debt became almost
50% more costly than individually held debt. In 2007, the average price of
a Stockholm apartment was about SEK 2 million. Suppose an apartment
trades at this price, and the co-op has a debt/equity ratio of 1:2. Then the
co-op debt associated with the apartment amounts to SEK 1 million. At
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current interest rates, a household with SEK 1 million in co-op debt could
reduce their monthy lending costs by about SEK 1,250 by replacing co-op
debt with household debt, equivalent to about 6% of the average pre-tax
monthly wage.28
The prevalence of biased consumers appears to distort market prices in
equilibrium. We examine market data before and after an unexpected reform
in 2006. If the market was perfectly e¢ cient, we would expect a relative price
change in favour of co-ops with low leverage. Despite the large sample size
and high explanatory power of our regression, we do not observe this. We
observe an e¤ect with the correct sign, but it is small in size and far from
statistically signicant. The model presented in in Section 4 predicted a
muted response to a change in the relative cost of the two forms of debt.
Our econometric results are consistent with this prediction.
A bias that leads to sub-optimal capital structures and the mispricing
of co-op debt in the housing market may be aggravated by consumersslug-
gishness to respond to changes in relative prices. The tendency to adhere
disproportionately to the choice that does not require active change has been
described as status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). When
28Source: Statistics Sweden. SEK 18,000  USD 2,200. The example is based on an
interest rate of 5%.
61
households are uncertain about what constitutes the optimal strategy they
may turn to their surroundings for guidance. This can exacerbate the slug-
gishness: [U]nsophisticated households tend to use whatever nancial con-
tracts are standard in a particular country, possibly because they follow the
lead of relatives and neighbors.(Campbell, 2006, p. 34). Herding behavior
of this kind would also explain why di¤erent types of mortgages are standard
in di¤erent countries. For example, xed-rate mortgages constitute the vast
majority of mortgages issued in the US, yet hardly exist in the UK (Miles,
2003).
What economic policies might mitigate the bias and its e¤ects on market
equilibrium? It is quite possible that regulation could go some way in reduc-
ing the scope for costly mistakes in this market. Regulation, however, often
comes at the cost of imposing restrictions on all participants in the mar-
ket. It is important to consider both costs and benets of di¤erent policy
options. To give an example, the problem of sub-optimal capital structures
could clearly be dealt with by simply banning co-op leverage. We believe
this to be an unwise policy choice. Short term debt is a convenient way for
co-ops to distribute unforeseen expenditures, such as the need to adjust the
premises to t new building laws, over slightly longer time periods. Banning
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such debt might protect naive consumers, but also imposes an inconvenience
cost on all consumers in the market.
Ideally, regulation should make it easier for consumers to make econom-
ically sensible decisions while still leaving the nal choice to the consumer.
This way regulation is kept at a minimally intrusive level. This regulatory ap-
proach to household nance has been described as libertarian paternalism
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008) or asymmetric paternalism(Camerer et
al, 2003). The aim is to target naive consumers without imposing welfare-
reducing restrictions on sophisticated consumers.
We suggest two policies that would reduce the scope for mistakes without
signicant infringements on consumer choice. First, the co-op monthly fee
could be itemized so that it is readily apparent what fraction of the fee is
used for service and maintenance on the one hand, and interest payments
on the other hand. This increases the salience of co-op debt and makes
the capital structure more transparent. Second, real estate agents could
be encouraged to disclose the co-op debt associated with an apartment in
their advertisements. This information can be inferred from a co-ops annual
statement. It is unlikely, however, that consumers will read annual state-
ments and make the necessary calculations at the early stages of choosing an
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apartment. Proving the information in the advertisement itself would serve
as a timely reminder to the consumer that the value of assets is the sum of
equity and debt, and facilitate quick comparisons between apartments with
di¤erent capital structures.
Both policies would be inexpensive to implement and would help con-
sumers make more informed decisions. We believe that both the rst and
second suggestion would be well suited to eld experiments, and encourage
further research along these lines. There is also a third, far more costly,
policy option that has the potential to greatly reduce the cost of failing to
understand co-op capital structures: making interest payments on co-op debt
tax deductible on par with individually held debt. Aside from political econ-
omy considerations, it is hard to see an economic rationale for the current
asymmetry. Finally, we note that some existing regulations   notably, rent
control and other restrictions on letting co-op apartments   exacerbate the
e¤ects of the bias on market equilibrium, by preventing arbitrage by sophis-
ticated consumers. A discussion of the merits of rent control are beyond
the scope of this paper, but we recommend that our ndings be taken into
account in a cost-benet analysis of the current system.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote
xhj = Pl   Ph + (Eh   El)rt  (E2h   E2l )cj (A.17)
The probability that an agent of type j = 1 will prefer a high equity
apartment over a low equity apartment is the sum of two terms:
P h1  Pfvai   (Ph) + Ehb1 > va
0
i   (Pl) + Elb1g  Pfvai > v0g (A.18)
The probability that the agent will stay in their current Eh apartment is
P 01  Pfv0   (Ph) + Ehb1 > va
0
i   (Pl) + Elb1g  P

vai < v
0
	
(A.19)
Denote h1 = P
h
1 + P
0
1 .
Therefore, with the above notations
P h1 =
1
2
Pfxh1 + vai > va
0
i g =
1
2
Z V
 V
1
2V
V + xh1 + v
2V
dv (A.20)
=
1
2
1
2
+
1
2V
1
4V
(xh1 + v)
2jV V

=
1
2
  xh1
2V
+ 0:5) (A.21)
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It is simple to show that the second probability is equal to the rst, so
0:5h1 = P
h
1 = P
0
1
Thus, the equilibrium conditions will solve
h1 + (1  )h2 =  (A.22)
in the market for high equity apartments and
l1 + (1  )l2 = 1   (A.23)
in the market for low equity apartments. It follows that
(x1=2V + 0:5) + (1  )(x2=2V + 0:5) =  (A.24)
Noting thathj = 1 lj, we get that the market for low equity apartments
clears as well.
Plugging in the values for x and multiplying both sides by V we get
Pl   Ph + (Eh   El)(rt  (1  )c2(1  r)(Eh + El)) + V = 2V (A.25)
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Similarly, for low equity apartments we get
Ph Pl+(El Eh)(rt  (1 )c2(1 r)(Eh+El))+V = 2(1 )V (A.26)
Proof of Proposition 4 The probability that an agent of type j = 1
stays in their current apartment is
01 =
V + xh1
4V
(A.27)
For an for an agent of type j = 2 the probability is
02 = 0:5
 
1  V + x
h
2
2V

(A.28)
Plugging in xh1 for Pl Ph we get xh1 = 2V  V +(1 )c(1 r)t(E2h E2l )
and xh2 = 2V   V   c(1  r)t(E2h   E2l ), implying that for j = 1,
01 =
V + xh1
4V
=
2V  + (1  )c(1  r)(E2h   E2l )
4V
(A.29)
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and for j = 2;
02 = 0:5
 
1  V + x
h
2
2V

=
2V (1  ) + c(1  r)(E2h   E2l )
4V
(A.30)
It is now easy to see that 01 > 
0
2 as long as  < 0 Also,
@01
@c
=
(1  )(1  r)(E2h   E2l )
4V
 @
0
2
@c
=
(1  r)(E2h   E2l )
4V
(A.31)
as soon as   0:5
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1
Awareness of own mortgage size and interest rate
"Do you know the size of your own
mortgage?"
Yes
No
Approx.
"Do you know what interest rate you are
paying on your mortgage?"
Yes
Approx.
No
Figure 2
Awareness of co-op debt size and interest rate
"Do you know how much debt your co-op
has taken on?"
No Approx.
Yes
"Do you know what interest rate your co-op
is paying on its debt?"
No
Approx.
Yes
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Figure 3
Awareness of tax shields
"Interest payments are tax deductible. True or
false?"
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
0
20
40
60
80
100
Own interest payments Co-op interest payments
Figure 4
Awareness of debt substitution
"Have you ever considered replacing co-op
debt with debt held individually by the co-op
members?"
Yes
No
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Table 1
Estimating a rational benchmark
r 1/(1-τ)
Pre-reform
MRS0 = 1/r
Post-reform
MRS1 = 1/r*1/(1-τ)
Rational benchmark
β 3 = MRS1-MRS0
0.04 1.43 25.00 35.71 10.71
0.05 1.43 20.00 28.57 8.57
0.06 1.43 16.67 23.81 7.14
Table 2
E¤ect of fee on price per m2
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Window: 10 days 20 days 30 days
Co-op fee -21.22 -19.50 -18.37
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Co-op fee*post-reform 2.71 -1.18 -1.84
(0.383) (0.583) (0.298)
Post-reform -1,506.27 982.86 1,338.56
(0.420) (0.449) (0.213)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 61,472.20 59,583.03 56,795.03
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 1105 2182 3052
R2 0.84 0.83 0.83
Robust p-values in parentheses. **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 3
Equal distributions before and after the reform
Pre-reform Post-reform Statistic H0 p -value
Mean 600.5 597.3 t -test Equality of means 0.23
Standard deviation 139.7 141.0 Levene Ratio of standard deviations = 1 0.50
Table 4
Sophistication is positively correlated with expected length of stay
(1) (2)
Sophisticated 7.51 7.01
(0.010)** (0.043)**
Years of residency so far -0.23
(0.060)*
Age 0.30
(0.000)***
Male -0.92
(0.636)
University -1.37
(0.461)
Constant 7.21 -1.94
(0.000)*** (0.514)
Observations 100 100
R2 0.09 0.24
Robust p -values in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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